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LETTER
Recipients’ Anonymity in Multihop Ad-hoc Networks
Helena RIFA`-POUS†,Member, Emmanouil A. PANAOUSIS††, and Christos POLITIS††,
SUMMARY Multihop ad-hoc networks have a dynamic topology. Re-
trieving a route towards a remote peer requires the execution of a recipient
lookup, which can publicly reveal sensitive information about him. Within
this context, we propose an efficient, practical and scalable solution to guar-
antee the anonymity of recipients’ nodes in ad-hoc networks.
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1. Introduction
The main characteristic of ad-hoc networks is that they con-
sist of heterogeneous devices that temporarily join the net-
work, in a spontaneous fashion, without the need of a net-
work infrastructure such as access points. User terminals act
as clients as well as routers of the network allowing any
other device to connect to a remote terminal through a mul-
tihop path. In such decentralized and open networks, one
of the main challenges is to protect the anonymity of the
users and their locations. The particular architecture of mul-
tihop ad-hoc networks has a number of functional character-
istics that are unique and specific to this type of network, and
which prevent the direct adoption of anonymity schemes de-
signed for classical wired networks. In particular, it is nec-
essary to highlight that:
• The auto-management of the network is carried out
through an open medium, susceptible to external at-
tacks; active as well as passive. If the network is wire-
less (as they use to be), messages can be captured and
heard by any user including malicious ones.
• Since any device can be participated in the forward-
ing of data across a multipath route, any compromised
node can significantly harm the ad-hoc communica-
tion. Furthermore, the devices usually come without
many advanced security components such as intru-
sion detection systems and trust managements mech-
anisms. These could prevent the network against inter-
nal attacks launched by compromised nodes.
• The network topology is dynamic and chaotic. In gen-
eral, terminals are mobile nodes with a transitory and
irregular state in the network.
• Network resources are limited. The terminals have low
processing, memory and battery capacity.
The elements to provide anonymity in a network
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are subject anonymity, undetectability and unobservabil-
ity of communications [1]. This paper focuses on subject
anonymity, which means that an attacker cannot sufficiently
identify the end-peers of a transaction within a group of sub-
jects. Subject anonymity can be divided into two separate
problems: source anonymity and recipients anonymity.
Source anonymity has typically being solved using
pseudonyms, random strings, or one time identifiers. In mul-
tihop ad-hoc networks there is no much problem in hiding
the source identity of a communication which can be estab-
lished using bogus identifiers. Once the transmission is on
and ready, the source can send its real identifier to the recip-
ient over a ciphered channel.
Regarding recipients anonymity, hiding the identity of
a destination is a challenging task. When a source wants to
establish a communication with another node, it has to initi-
ate a lookup for that particular recipient. In this lookup, all
the nodes in the network have to collaborate to encounter
the destination and construct a path towards it. Performing a
target search while keeping its privacy preserved it is not a
straightforward goal. Today’s solutions are either computa-
tionally expensive and robust, or practical and vulnerable. In
this letter, we briefly review the issues of present solutions
and propose a novel and practical mechanism that provides
recipient’s anonymity for multihop ad-hoc networks. As
shown in section 4, this protocol is efficient and can be
scaled to large networks.
2. Related work
One-way trapdoor functions are normally used to establish
the anonymous identification of a destination. A trapdoor
is a function that can detrimentally compute in one direc-
tion and is difficult to compute in the other direction without
any ”trapdoor” information. In the context of ad-hoc net-
works, when a source node looks for a recipient, it sends the
identification information about the destination node, hid-
den in a trapdoor function so that only the legitimate receiver
is allowed to recover it. The easiest way to implement a trap-
door function is by using public key cryptography. See for
example the protocols SDAR [2], ARMR [3] and AnonDSR
[4]. In these works the identity of the receiver is ciphered
with its public key so that only the receiver will be able to
successfully open the message. However, this solution has
an overall high cost for the network since each node that
gets the message has to compute a public key cryptographic
operation to discover whether it is the intended recipient
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or not. Furthermore, considering that the route discovery
is normally done via flooding mechanisms the final system
load becomes significantly unsustainable.
In a similar way, protocols like ANODR [5] and ASR
[6] make use of symmetric cryptography to hide the desti-
nation’s identity. In this case, source and destination share
a TESLA key [7]. Source node ciphers destination node’s
identity together with a random number using the symmet-
ric key shared with the destination. The only node which is
capable of opening the message and validate its identity it is
the real recipient. Although these mechanisms are more effi-
cient than those based on public key cryptography, the over-
head across the network is still high. Moreover, they face the
problem that source and destination must interchange a key
before the ad-hoc network’s establishment.
The ANAP protocol [8] proposes to identify the desti-
nation using the hash value of user’s pseudonymous. How-
ever, the problem is how the source of a transmission can
get the pseudonymous of the destination node. By assum-
ing that such pseudonymous is public, attackers can pre-
compute tables with the pairs pseudonymous-hashes. In this
way, when a packet is captured in the network a destina-
tion node can be immediately discovered. On the other hand
when the pseudonymous is secret, then using hashes does
not provide enough strong security.
3. Proposed Methodology
In this section we discuss our work on how to preserve the
anonymity of the recipient in multihop ad-hoc networks. We
assume that the users of the network held a public key cer-
tificate. The certificate is the anchor to build the anonymous
identifiers. The proposed protocol uses a two-level scheme
to build a multihop path in which intermediate nodes can
not identify the target of a communication, and a source can
uniquely send its data to the intended destination peer.
To this end, a high-level trapdoor is applied first. This
trapdoor is simple to evaluate and it points to a target group
of nodes. Thereafter the nodes that belong to the target group
need to evaluate a second and more costly trapdoor, called
the low-level trapdoor to determine if they indeed are the
intended destination of the communication.
In particular, the high-level trapdoor is implemented
getting the truncated hash of users’ public key to identify
the users. Using a truncated hash provokes collisions, i.e.,
multiple users share the same truncated hash and so the iden-
tifier. Hence, the user identifier no longer points to a single
user but a group of them. The benefit is that eavesdroppers
and intermediate users that participate in a route discovery,
have no means to find out who the packet is submitted to, al-
though they discover that some users meet the criteria.
To uniquely identify the target of the transmission (the
destination node), the scheme uses a public key ciphertext
as the low-level trapdoor. The users that meet the terms
of the high-level trapdoor, must try to decipher a byte se-
quence. However, only the intended recipient will be able to
do this action successfully. Despite other protocols that use
public key algorithms, our solution does not require every
intermediate node to compute the costly decipherment oper-
ation. Thus the overhead of the protocol is not significantly
high as we will see in section 4.
In the following, we describe in detail the process of
looking up a destination and establishing a route between
two ad-hoc nodes, according our protocol:
1. The source user, UA, generates a random sequence r
of 128 bytes and computes salt = hashtsl(r), where
hashtsl is a hash function which output is truncated to
the leftmost sl bits.
2. UA prepares the high-level trapdoor function that points
to the destination user UB. To this end, it gets the desti-
nations’s public key pbkB from a public directory, and
computes H = hashthl(salt||pbkB), with || the concate-
nation function and hl the length of the truncated hash
output. Then, UA builds a pseudonymous identifier
pid aB for UB in the following way: pid aB = salt||H.
3. UA prepares the low-level trapdoor function ciphering
the random sequence r: pid bB = EpbkB(r), where E(.)
is a public key cryptography algorithm.
4. Finally, UA generates a lookup route request with the
identifiers pid aB and pid bB.
5. When a user Ux receives a route request, it checks
whether it is the target destination of the lookup by
computing H′ = hashhl(salt||pbkx). If H′ = H, Ux
has successfully opened the high-level trapdoor func-
tion and thus it is a candidate target.
6. Candidate targets attempt to open the low-level trap-
door function to verify whether they are the actual des-
tination of a transmission or not. To this end, they
compute: a = Dprkx (pid bB), where D(.) is a pub-
lic key decipherment function and prkx is their private
key. Then, they check whether salt = hashsl(a) and if
this matches, the user is the intended recipient.
4. Analysis
In this section we analyse the performance of the proto-
col in a particular network. We assume an open, wire-
less and multihop ad-hoc network which operates in a
metropolitan environment where churn is one of the main
characteristics. The number of potential nodes of the net-
work can be significantly large (hundreds of thousands)
since it comprises citizens, business people, tourists and any
other user that joins and leaves the ad-hoc network periodi-
cally or just once. However, the number of the active users
per second is within the range of 50 − 150.
We configure the network with the length of the salt
sl set to 10 bytes, and the length of the hash hl to 1 byte.
The salt is used to avoid the in advance generation of tables
that map users’ keys to some particular identifiers, and to
guarantee that a user is always identified with a different
pid a. Brute force attacks that compute the pid a for all
the users of the network cannot be performed in real time
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Fig. 1 Percentage of collisions in a network
users. Nevertheless, even if the attacks succeed, a malicious
user cannot know who the real destination of a message is,
but only who belongs to the group of candidate recipients.
The smaller the size of the truncated hash H, the bigger the
group of destination candidates for a message and the higher
the anonymity level. Contrary, bigger sizes of H increase the
efficiency of the system since only a few users shall continue
to the more costly low-level trapdoor phase of the protocol.
Thus, there is a trade-off between the anonymity level and
the efficiency of the system, which is determined by the size
of the truncated hash.
We examined the scenario using Monte Carlo simu-
lations. On the one hand, Fig. 1 shows the percentage of
pid a’s collisions in networks of different sizes. The num-
ber of collisions in networks with more than 2,600 registered
users is higher than 90%. Therefore, in public networks with
lots of potential users, an attacker will not succeed to extract
network information using traffic analysis.
On the other hand, Fig. 2 analyses the overhead of the
system. It depicts the probability that when a route discov-
ery protocol towards a particular recipient is executed in the
network, the searched pid a is shared among several users.
The plot shows that in networks with 100 connected users,
the probability of a collision is 32%, and the probability of 2
or more collisions is less than 6%. Thus, from the total 100
connected participants, only a few nodes which are not the
intended receiver of the communication may have to exectue
a resource-consuming [9], [10] public key decryption oper-
ation. The overhead of the system for a recipient’s lookup
is null with a probability of 74.65%, one decryption with
25.35%, two decryptions with 5.06%, and three or more de-
cryptions with < 1%. So, the protocol is efficient and does
not suppose unaffordable costs for the ad-hoc network.
5. Conclusions
In this letter we have proposed a novel and simple method
to provide recipients’ anonymity in multihop ad-hoc net-
works and we have analysed its applicability to a particu-
lar scenario. Results show that the algorithm is efficient, ro-
bust, and scalable to large networks. Compared with anony-
mous methods that are solely based on hiding users iden-
tities with a hash, our proposal is more robust. In partic-
ular, identities change in every lookup so attackers cannot
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Fig. 2 Percent chance of collisions in a recipient’s lookup
tionary attacks are not possible since they usually require
more time than the lifetime of a certain identity. Compared
with solutions that are based on ciphering the identifier of
the recipient with its own public key, our proposal is much
more efficient since not all of the active nodes have to deci-
pher a string to check whether they are the actual recipients.
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